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Abstract
When a rm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential,
managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small manager-
ial bonus linked to rm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between
managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring share-
holders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial
bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher man-
agerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company
leverage and lower company diversication. These predictions nd some sup-
port in the empirical literature.
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1 Introduction
In modern companies managers and shareholders together strive to enhance rm's
value; they are, however, in competition when sharing the rm's revenues, not only
internally, but also with outside investors (as pointed out by Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Designing the optimal managerial compensation has to account for this double-
edged competition. While managerial compensation improves managerial eort, it
also reduces the amount of resources available to repay shareholders for their mon-
itoring and bondholders for their investment in the rm. The impact of greater
managerial compensation on company value crucially depends on the eect on all
parties' incentives.
The interplay between managerial compensation and the nancial structure of a
rm is not new in literature (see Murphy,1999, for a review). We depart from such
literature by explicitly introducing shareholders' monitoring for at least two reasons.
First, shareholders' monitoring is as important as managerial eort to improve com-
pany value: for instance Core et al. (1999) nd evidence that governance structures
with greater control on managers improve company performance, while Huson et al.
(2001) show that monitoring by shareholders increases the rate of replacement of
managers in response to a poor company perfomance. Second, although managerial
eort is essential, the empirical evidence on managerial compensation is controversial:
for example Jensen and Murphy (1990) document that CEO pay-performance sensi-
tivity is only 3.25$ per 1000$ change in shareholder value. This evidence questions
the eectiveness of monetary incentives alone, without shareholders' monitoring, to
enhance managerial eort.
In the model, managers strive to put in the essential eort but are subject to
moral hazard: monetary incentives and shareholders' monitoring motivate their eort.
Given that monitoring is unobservable, there is an additional moral hazard between
shareholders and bondholders. In a leveraged rm, this moral hazard curtails insiders
eort. Our ndings show that shareholders in leveraged rms might nd it optimal
to pay a bonus to their managers in order to show bondholders a greater commitment
towards monitoring. The direct eect of a larger managerial bonus is to increase the
eort of the manager. However, when exerting greater eort, the manager reduces
the likelihood of company bankruptcy; as a result, the incentive for shareholders to
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monitor increases in that they are residual claimants of any benet from monitoring
when the rm is solvent. Even a small managerial bonus helps to restore correct
incentives for insiders, creating a virtuous circle, reducing the cost of external debt and
enhancing total company value. This benet is greater in leveraged and undiversied
rms.
The implications of the model nd empirical support in Duru et al.(2005) concern-
ing the relation between managerial bonuses, corporate bond yields and leverage and
in Rose and Shepard (1997) documenting a reduction in the managerial compensation
as a consequence of increased corporate diversication.
The research outlined in this paper relates to the literature on managerial com-
pensation and nancial structure of the rm (John and John, 1993; Calcagno and
Renneboog, 2006; Berkovitz et al., 2000). There the focus is on asset substitution ef-
forts of insiders, while here the focus is on the monitoring eort of the owner. This has
dierent implications for optimal managerial compensation. In the literature investi-
gating asset substitution, shareholders and managers' interests are aligned through an
increase in the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation, by means of
bonuses or stock-holdings. In a leveraged rm, greater pay-performance sensitivity of
managerial compensation increases the cost of debt since bondholders anticipate the
increased asset substitution attitude of managers; thus pay-performance sensitivity
decreases with the level of debt. Here, instead, it is shown that a greater sensitivity
to company revenues improves not only managerial eort, but - most importantly -
shareholders' monitoring, reinforcing insiders' incentives to exert extra eort. This
has a positive consequence on the cost of debt. While a managerial bonus alone in-
troduces a problem of competition for scarce resources between company insiders and
outsiders, shareholders' monitoring helps to mitigate this competition.
The idea of eciency wages (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, and subsequent pa-
pers) is here applied to managerial compensation schemes: managers' moral hazard is
curbed through monetary incentives, but in addition shareholders monitor and punish
their managers when any shirking is detected. This paper underlines the importance
of insiders' monitoring as in the literature on shareholders' monitoring (see for in-
stance Huddart, 1993; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). Although
we share the opinion expressed in the literature that the eorts of shareholders and
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managers are both essential for the project, we dier in that we believe that the eorts
are complementary, and we thus focus on the case of under- provision of monitoring.
Finally we share some insights with the literature on nancial structure as incen-
tive mechanism (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), and on debt as an optimal incentive
mechanism when insiders exert unobservable eort (Innes, 1990; and Cerasi and Dal-
tung, 2000). In this paper, we add the interaction between managerial eort and the
eorts of the owners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic
model, Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium eorts and debt rate, and Section 4 presents
optimal managerial compensation. Section 5 extends the basic model. The empirical
predictions of the model are contained in Section 6, and concluding remarks are found
in Section 7.
2 The basic model
Consider a two-date economy (T = 0; 1) with three types of agents: entrepreneurs,
investors and managers. An entrepreneur, without capital, starts up a risky project.
Investors have capital to invest. A manager can enhance the success of the risky
project. The entrepreneur hires the manager to run the project and raises funds from
investors.
There are risky projects in the economy. Each project requires 1 unit of capital
at date 0 and returns R with probability p at date 1: Project returns are i.i.d. The
success probability of each project depends on the combined eorts of the manager
and the entrepreneur. We start by focusing on a single project rm and leave to
Sub-section 5.2 the discussion of the role of diversication in the case of two projects.
The manager exerts an eort e 2 [0; 1] at a private cost. A moral hazard is
present in that the entrepreneur cannot observe the behavior of the manager without
costs. The entrepreneur has access to a monitoring technology: by monitoring with
intensity m 2 [0; 1], he detects with probability m misbehavior by his manager.
The two eorts, monitoring and managerial eort, are costly and cannot be observed
outside the rm: the monitoring eort costs c1
2
m2 with c1 > 0; while the managerial
eort costs c2
2
e2 with c2  c1 > 0 since running a project requires more time than
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monitoring it. There is an additional moral hazard because investors cannot observe
insiders' eorts.
The combined impact of the eort of the manager and of the monitoring of the
entrepreneur is captured by the probability of success of the project. Managerial eort
and monitoring eort are perfect substitutes and impact equally on the probability
of success of the project: the probability reaches its maximum, pH ; when either the
manager or the entrepreneur exert maximum eort on the project, and its minimum,
pL < pH , when both eort levels are zero. The specic form of the probability derives
from the outcome of the strategic interaction of the manager and of the entrepreneur,
as it will become clear in the following Sub-section.
Without any eort, the expected return of the risky project is lower than the gross
return from an alternative value preserving safe investment, i.e.,
pLR < 1: (A1)
However, when either of the two agents exert maximum eort, the project return, net
of the cost of eort, is greater than the alternative return:
pHR  c2
2
> 1: (A2)
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of date 0; the entrepreneur sets
the managerial compensation for the manager. Then the entrepreneur raises funds
from perfectly competitive capital markets and entrepreneur and manager choose,
respectively, monitoring eort m and managerial eort e. Eort choices are not
observable, while returns from the projects are observable to outsiders. At date 1
project returns are realized and claims are settled. Figure 1 summarizes the timing
of the model.
Insert Figure 1
With this timing we assume that investors observe the managerial compensation.
This assumption is common to other papers, as for instance in John and John (1993),
and derives from the fact that public rms in the U.S. are obliged by the SEC to
disclose compensation paid to managers.
The model is solved backwards: equilibrium eort, monitoring and return to in-
vestors are computed for given managerial compensation. Then, entrepreneur's opti-
mal choice of managerial compensation is resolved.
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2.1 Managerial compensation
The manager, who responds to monetary incentives, is oered a managerial compen-
sation. The managerial compensation is the sum of a xed salary and a managerial
bonus. The xed salary is set at equal to the zero outside option of the manager. The
managerial bonus b 2 [0; R] is by contract dependent on the observable return from
the project and it is paid whenever the project succeeds. The entrepreneur retains the
option to re the manager, when, as a result of monitoring, he detects misbehavior
by the manager.1 The project's probability of success is pH when the old manager is
red and a new manager is hired.
Figure 2 depicts the strategic interaction of the entrepreneur and of the manager.
Insert Figure 2
From Figure 2 we derive the form of the probability of success of the project:
p = [m+ e(1 m)] pH + (1 m)(1  e)pL:
The probability of success is pH when either the manager or the entrepreneur exert
eort, or when, as a result of monitoring, the manager is red and another one is hired
in his place; the probability is pL when the manager shirks without being detected.
Once simplied, the probability of success becomes
p = pH   (1  e)(1 m); (1)
with   pH   pL > 0: Figure 2 depicts the gross return for the entrepreneur and
the manager, given their choices of eort. For given managerial compensation, the
utility of the manager is
u = q b  c2
2
e2; (2)
where q = e pH + (1   e)(1  m)pL is the probability that the manager is rewarded
the bonus. The manager chooses to exert eort with intensity e : when he performs
successfully, he earns the managerial bonus with probability pH ; otherwise with prob-
ability pL: However, when he shirks his duties and the entrepreneur detects him, he
1The decision to re the manager is at the entrepreneur's discretion. This is in line with the
empirical fact that managerial contracts are riskier when compared to workers' labor contracts. In
particular there is no "good cause" clause in the managerial contract, while this is required in the
worker's contract.
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is red with probability m(1   e), and he is not paid the bonus. Notice that the
probability of pocketing the managerial bonus is lower compared to the probability of
success for the project, that is q = p m(1  e) pH < p: The reason is that, although
the project might succeed, the manager will not earn the managerial bonus if caught
shirking. However the new manager is paid the same bonus as the old manager.2
2.2 Financing of the rm
To start a project, an entrepreneur with ! units of inside equity issues D = 1   !
units of debt on perfectly competitive nancial markets. For each unit, the debt claim
promises to pay a face value r on date 1. Given the random return from the project
net of the managerial bonus Z, the expected prot of the entrepreneur (the owner or
the main shareholder of the rm) can be expressed as
 = Emax fZ   rD; 0g   !   c1
2
m2; (3)
where the rst term represents the expected total returns from the projects net of
managerial bonus and after debt-holders have been repaid, the second term is the
opportunity cost of entrepreneur's capital and the third term is the monitoring cost.
Expression (3) shows that debt carries a bankruptcy risk. Since the entrepreneur is
subject to limited liability but invests in a risky project, debt-holders may not obtain
the promised face value. We can rewrite eq.(3) as
 = p (R  b) D [r   S]  !   c1
2
m2; (4)
where [r S]D = rD Emax frD   Z; 0g is the expected return to debt-holders, the
dierence between the debt rate r and the expected shortfalls on the face value of debt
S = (1   p)r. The expected shortfalls vary with monitoring and managerial eort
in line with the probability of success of projects: greater monitoring and managerial
eort lead to greater probability of honoring the debt and smaller expected shortfalls.
2This assumption guarantees that the entrepreneur will not re the manager too often, given that
the monitoring outcome is non-observable. After ring a manager, the entrepreneur hires another
manager and pays him exactly the same bonus: thus he will not re the old manager to save the
bonus.
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3 Equilibrium eorts and debt rate
We now turn to the equilibrium eort choices, monitoring and managerial eort, and
to the equilibrium debt rate, for a given managerial bonus b.
The entrepreneur and the manager choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively
their eorts; then investors, anticipating the equilibrium eorts, set the debt rate
accordingly. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium of the game in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 1 For a given managerial bonus b; the symmetric equilibrium in which
the manager exerts eort be(b), the entrepreneur exerts monitoring eort bm(b) and
pays to investors the debt rate br(b); is characterized by the solution to the following
equations:
[ + bm(b)pL] b  c2be(b) = 0; (5)
(1  be(b))(R  b) +D@ bS(b)
@m
  c1 bm(b) = 0; (6)br(b)  bS(b) = 1: (7)
where D @
bS(b)
@m
=  br(b)D(1  be(b)) and bS(b) = (1  bp(b))br(b):
Proof. See the appendix.
Eq.(5) shows that the eort of the manager increases when either the managerial
bonus or monitoring increases; in other words, the managerial bonus and monitoring
are substitutes to induce higher managerial eort.
Eq.(6) shows the moral hazard between the entrepreneur and investors. The
moral hazard of external nancing is captured by the negative sign of the second
term, i.e., the derivative of the expected shortfalls with respect to monitoring: as
the monitoring eort increases, the probability of success rises and this reduces the
expected shortfalls. The marginal benet of monitoring is partially appropriated by
investors through a reduction in the expected shortfalls. Given that investors cannot
observe the monitoring intensity, the debt rate will not be adjusted accordingly and
this reduces the monitoring eort of the entrepreneur. The severity of this moral
hazard depends on the size of expected shortfalls: expected shortfalls are reduced by
increases in either managerial eort or entrepreneurial monitoring.
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Finally, eq.(7) shows that in equilibrium the expected return from risky debt must
equal the alternative return 1.
Once we substitute the symmetric equilibrium eorts, monitoring and debt rate in
eq.(4), the entrepreneur's prots are:
b(b) = bp(b)(R  b)  1  c1
2
bm(b)2; (8)
where bp(b) = pH   (1   bm(b))(1   be(b)): We now turn to the optimal managerial
compensation.
4 Optimal managerial compensation
In the rst stage, the entrepreneur, who anticipates eort choices and debt rate, sets
the level of the managerial bonus to maximize his prots in eq.(8). The entrepreneur
nds it optimal to pay a managerial bonus whenever equilibrium prots increase with
the bonus. We compare equilibrium prots without a bonus b(0) to equilibrium
prots in (8) and derive:
b(b)  b(0) = R [bp(b)  bp(0)]  bbp(b)  c1
2
 bm(b)2   bm(0)2 : (9)
The dierence in prots depends upon three components: the dierence in success
probabilities, the direct impact of the bonus on total revenues and the dierence in
monitoring costs. Given that the managerial bonus has a direct negative eect on
prots, a necessary condition for its optimality is that it has a positive impact on the
probability of success. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold value m 2 (0; 1) such that the probability
of success with the managerial bonus is higher than without it, bp(b) > bp(0); if the
entrepreneur monitoring eort with the bonus bm(b) is greater than m.
Proof. See the appendix.
Given the diculty to nd a closed-form solution for the equilibrium equations
in (5)-(7) due to non-linearities, we use a numerical example to show cases in which
prots might be higher with a managerial bonus than without it. Let us take a
specic numerical example where the project is entirely nanced through debt. We
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derive the equilibrium prots for dierent values of the managerial bonus when pL =
0:6; pH = 0:85; R = 1:65, c1 = 0:1 and c2 = 0:35: When the managerial bonus is
b = 0 in equilibrium the manager does not exert any eort, while the entrepreneur
exerts an insucient monitoring eort: prots are close to zero b(0) = 0:014. If the
managerial bonus is set to b = 0:06; the manager exerts an eort be(0:06) = 0:11
and the entrepreneur a monitoring eort bm(0:06) = 0:67 earning prots b(0:06) =
0:215 > 0:014: The result hinges on the benecial eect of the bonus on the cost of
external nance. Investors who observe the managerial bonus anticipate the increase
in the success probability of the projects and ask for a lower debt rate. The debt rate
falls from br(0) = 1:63 to br(0:06) = 1:28 with the managerial bonus. This reduces the
share of revenues for investors and improves the entrepreneur's incentive to monitor.
The impact of a greater managerial bonus on the monitoring intensity in equi-
librium can be separated into two eects, one negative, one positive. The negative
eect stems from net project revenues: given the monitoring eort a higher man-
agerial bonus implies a greater share of project returns to managers, thus improving
manager's incentives and conversely reducing the incentives of the entrepreneur to
monitor. The positive eect derives from the expected shortfalls: greater eort by
the manager reduces the derivative of the shortfalls in eq.(6), thus strengthening
monitoring incentives of the entrepreneur. There are cases where the positive eect
dominates and monitoring increases.
Investors, anticipating that with the bonus the manager exerts a higher eort and
that a smaller probability of default of the project increases the monitoring eort of
the entrepreneur, demand a lower interest rate. This reduces the cost of the external
nance and rises overall prots. The bonus serves as an optimal commitment to
increase the monitoring eort of the entrepreneur. The crucial assumption for the
result is that investors observe managerial compensation. The result in this paper
oers an additional rationale for why this is benecial for rms demanding external
nance.
5 Leverage and diversication
The model shows the optimality of managerial bonuses as a way for the entrepreneur
to commit to a higher level of monitoring level. This result depends on leverage and
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diversication.
5.1 Greater leverage
The optimal managerial bonus depends on the level of debt over total assets, i.e.,
the rm's leverage. Proposition 2 shows that the benet of the managerial bonus
may be important enough to achieve greater probability of success than without the
managerial bonus. To see when this result occurs, we conduct some comparative
statistics.
Proposition 3 The threshold m 2 (0; 1) decreases with the amount of debt D:
Proof. See the appendix.
As the level of debt increases, the problem of the moral hazard of the entrepre-
neur becomes more acute; at the equilibrium the level of monitoring decreases. This
reduces equilibrium prots. An increase in the managerial bonus increases the man-
agerial eort and thus ameliorates the moral hazard of the entrepreneur. This reduces
the cost of the external nance and increases the equilibrium prots.
Figure 3 shows the entrepreneur's equilibrium monitoring eort, while Figure 4
entrepreneur's equilibrium prots, as functions of the managerial bonus for dierent
levels of debt, D = 0 and D = 1.
Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4
The optimal managerial bonus is larger in rms with greater leverage. Conversely,
the smaller the inside equity the greater the moral hazard of the entrepreneur: to
induce monitoring the entrepreneur must pay managers a greater managerial bonus.
Given that the managerial bonus is observable to investors, this implies a greater
commitment to monitoring by the entrepreneur.
5.2 Larger number of projects
The optimal managerial bonus depends on the number of independent projects D+!:
We extend the basic model to the case of 2 projects to see how the result on the
optimality of the managerial bonus changes with greater diversication.3
3In the model, the increase in size coincides with greater diversication. In the real world,
however, size and degree of diversication can be disentangled, since projects can be selected from
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To start 2 projects, an entrepreneur with ! units of inside equity issues D = 2 !
units of debt on perfectly competitive markets.4 As before, for each unit, the debt
claim promises to pay a face value r on date 1: The entrepreneur assignes each project
to a dierent manager. The distribution of total returns from projects now is dierent
from the model with a single project as the revenues come from the sum of two
independent projects. Given total returns from projects, net of managerial bonus
payments, Z; the expected prot of the entrepreneur can be expressed as
 =
2X
i=1
pi (R  b) D [r   S]  !   c1
2
2X
i=1
m2i ; i = 1; 2: (10)
where the rst term represents the expected total returns from the 2 projects net
of the managerial bonus, the second term is the expected return to debt-holders,
the third term is the opportunity cost of entrepreneur's capital and the last term is
the sum of monitoring costs. The expected return to debt-holders is the dierence
between the debt rate r and the expected shortfalls on the face value of debt S:
Similarly to the single project case, the symmetric equilibrium of the game is
characterized by the equations in Proposition 1. The expressions of the expected
shortfalls and their derivative with respect to monitoring are now dierent, given
that the distribution of total returns from the 2 projects has changed compared to
that of a single project (see Appendix - Part A - for the detailed expression of expected
shortfalls and their derivative in this case).
In the following Proposition we show how the monitoring eort changes when the
entrepreneur increases the number of projects, switching from a single project to two
projects, for a given leverage.
Proposition 4 For a given leverage, the threshold m 2 (0; 1) increases with the
number of projects.
Proof. See the appendix.
more or less correlated opportunities. See for instance Hellwig (1998) for a model where this choice
is analyzed in a setting without delegation.
4While in the single project case debt and outside equity are equivalent nancial contracts, this
is not true anymore in the 2 projects case. Thus we use the result in Innes (1990) who shows that
debt is the optimal solution when the entrepreneur exerts a non-observable and costly eort.
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For a given leverage, as the number of independent projects increases from 1 to 2
the optimal managerial bonus decreases. For instance in the same numerical example
as that in Section 4, for the entrepreneur starting 2 projects instead of one project,
the optimal bonus is 0:05 whereas it was 0:06 in the single project case. Notice that
the entrepreneur has to issue 1 unit more of debt to fund the additional project:
however the increased diversication reduces the moral hazard of the entrepreneur.
Given that the number of projects is observable by investors before signing the
debt contract, increasing the number of projects has a commitment eect on the en-
trepreneur's monitoring. From eq.(6) the moral hazard of the entrepreneur depends
on the size of the expected shortfalls on debt. As the number of independent projects
increases, expected shortfalls and their derivative reduce.5 The derivative captures
the moral hazard of the entrepreneur and decreases with the number of independent
projects: in a diversied rm it will be very small. As the size of the rm increases,
the incentive to monitor by the entrepreneur is stronger even without a manager-
ial bonus. This mechanism is analyzed in Cerasi and Daltung (2000), where it is
shown that, when the degree of diversication reduces variability in the distribution
of project returns, lessening the probability of failure of the rm increases the incen-
tive to monitor of the entrepreneur. Managerial bonuses and diversication are thus
substitute mechanisms to strengthen insiders' incentives.
6 Empirical implications
The model has numerous empirical predictions on the level of managerial compensa-
tion. This paper shares with many others (e.g., John and John, 1993) the implication
that managerial compensation and nancial structure of the rm are to be studied
together. This implication nds empirical support in Hartzell and Starcks (2003).
The model predicts that, once we control for the degree of diversication and
leverage, rms paying higher managerial bonus to their managers have a lower cost
of external debt. Evidence of a negative cross-sectional relation between managerial
bonus and returns to bondholders is supportive of our model. Duru et al. (2005) nd
that larger managerial bonuses are associated with lower corporate bond yields and
5The property that expected shortfalls are smaller in the case of two projects is due to the
Binomial distribution of total returns. In a more general case, according to the law of large numbers,
it is possible to nd a number of projects suciently large for the expected shortfalls to decrease.
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conclude that managerial bonuses help reduce the cost of external debt in contrast
with the empirical evidence on the relation between managerial stock-holdings and
bond yields (see, for instance, De Fusco et al., 1990, among others).
Another prediction of the model is that, once controls are set for rm size or degree
of diversication, the higher the leverage, the greater the level of managerial bonus:
as the acuteness of moral hazard increases, insiders shift the greater risk of default
onto creditors due to limited liability. A greater managerial bonus serves to increase
insiders' incentives. There is empirical evidence that more leveraged rms pay higher
managerial bonuses to their managers. Again Duru et al. (2005) nd that more
leveraged rms tend to pay greater managerial bonuses to their managers. Other pa-
pers, such Mehran (1992) and Berger et al. (1997), point out that managers in more
leveraged rms have greater pay-performance sensitivity compensation. Evidence in
support of the model is that managers in rms owned by a small number of shareolders
- i.e., closely held rms - are rewarded with lower bonuses as shareholders' incentives
to monitor are greater. Core et al. (1999) report that CEO pay-performance sensi-
tivity is lower in rms with larger numbers of monitoring shareholders. Edwards et
al. (2006) nd that pay-performance sensitivity measured on managerial bonuses de-
creases when there are large independent shareholders. Furthermore, in management
buyouts, that is in LBOs where the same management runs the company, greater
leverage is accompanied by the adoption of greater pay-performance incentives for
managers (see Kaplan, 1989).
Finally, a prediction of the model is that more diversied rms should pay lower
managerial bonuses, given that managerial bonuses and a higher degree of diversica-
tion are alternative mechanisms to improve insiders' incentives. Jensen and Murphy
(1990) report empirical evidence that in larger rms the average sensitivity of man-
agerial compensation to change in shareholders wealth is 1.85$ compared with the
gure of 8.05$ in smaller rms. This prediction is in line with this evidence, when
larger rms are also more diversied: Rose and Shepard (1997) show that changes
in incumbent CEO compensation levels are negatively correlated with changes in the
degree of corporate diversication.
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7 Conclusion and extensions
This paper analyses the optimal level of managerial bonus when rms are leveraged
and non-diversied. When monitoring by shareholders is essential, although subject
to moral hazard, managerial bonus provides a commitment to exert greater eort
by insiders towards external claim-holders. The model predicts greater managerial
pay-performance sensitivity, the greater the leverage and the lower the degree of
diversication.
Throughout the analysis we have assumed that managers are paid out of project
revenues before bondholders, namely that they are senior compared to other creditors.
In the model with a single project this assumption is neutral, while it is crucial for
the model with two projects. One possible eect of a dierent seniority of managerial
bonuses is that managers could be punished not only when shirking, but also when
the rm is unable to repay bondholders (see for instance John and John, 1993; and
Calcagno and Renneboog, 2006). The optimal priority of claims structure is out of
the scope of this paper and requires further investigation.
In the model with 2 projects we have assumed that each manager is assigned to
a single risky project. Laux (2001) shows that assigning more than one project to
each manager could be optimal, because it increases the set of states in which the
entrepreneur can punish the manager. The interaction between internal hierarchy
and managerial compensation is left to future research.
Finally, in this paper we have focused on managerial bonuses while ignoring other
forms of pay-performance incentives, such as stock-options or direct stock-holdings to
managers. Given our simple setup, where each manager is assigned to only one project
and project returns are dichotomic, our bonus variable can be easily re-interpreted
as managerial equity holdings. In a more general setup, we would have to distinguish
between the dierent forms of managerial pay-performance compensation.
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A Prots with 2 projects
Total return on projects, net of managerial bonus payments, Z; has the Binomial
distribution
Z =
8<:
0 (1  pi)(1  p i)
R  b pi(1  p i) + p i(1  pi)
2 (R  b) pip i
and average equal to
E (Z) = (pi + p i) (R  b) , (11)
where pi is given by (1), i 2 f1; 2g and i 6=  i. The expected prot is
 = Emax fZ   rD; 0g   !   c1
2
2X
i=1
m2i .
This can be rewritten using the transformation max f0; xg = x+max f0; xg as
 = E(Z)  rD + Emax frD   Z; 0g   !   c1
2
2X
i=1
m2i .
This expression simplies to (10) once we substitute (11) and [r   S]D = rD  
Emax frD   Z; 0g, where S is given by
S = r(1  pi)(1  p i) + 1
D
max frD   (R  b) ; 0g [pi(1  p i) + p i(1  pi)] .
For a given managerial bonus b, face value r and managerial eort ei the entrepreneur
chooses the monitoring intensity to maximize prots in (10), that is
@
@mi
= (1  ei)(R  b) +D @S
@mi
  c1mi = 0; i = 1; 2: (12)
with
D
@S
@mi
= [max frD   (R  b) ; 0g (1  2p i)  rD(1  p i)] (1  ei):
For a given managerial bonus b; debt rate r and monitoring intensitymi; each manager
chooses the eort to maximize his utility in (2):
@ui
@ei
= ( +mipL)b  c2ei = 0; i = 1; 2: (13)
The Nash equilibrium is given by the solution to (12) and (13). In the symmetric
Nash equilibrium ei = e i = be(b) and mi = m i = bm(b). The system of equations
that denes the symmetric equilibrium, collapses to the system of equations (5)-(7)
with
D
@ bS(b)
@mi
= [max fbr(b)D   (R  b) ; 0g (1  2bp(b))  br(b)D(1  bp(b))] (1  be(b)):
(14)bS(b) = br(b)(1  bp(b))2 + 2
D
max fbr(b)D   (R  b) ; 0g bp(b)(1  bp(b)) (15)
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: For a given managerial bonus b, face value r and manage-
rial eort e the entrepreneur chooses the monitoring intensity to maximize prots in
(4), that is
@
@m
= (1  e)(R  b) +D @S
@m
  c1m = 0; (16)
with
D
@S
@m
=  rD(1  e):
For a given managerial bonus b; debt rate r and monitoring intensitym; each manager
chooses the eort to maximize his utility in (2):
@u
@e
= ( +mpL)b  c2e = 0: (17)
The Nash equilibrium is given by the couple of eorts fbm(b); be(b)g solution to (16)
and (17). In addition investors require their expected return to be equal to 1 , that
is [r   S]D = D: They rationally anticipate that the equilibrium eort is be(b) and
monitoring bm(b) for a given managerial bonus b: Substituting equilibrium eorts in
the investors' rationality condition gives (7). 2
Proof of Proposition 2: From equilibrium conditions in Proposition 1, substituting
(7) into (6) gives


R  Dbp(b)

= c1
bm(b)
(1  be(b)) + b (18)
where bp(b) = pH   (1  bm(b))(1  be(b)): When b = 0 the above condition collapses
to


R  Dbp(0)

= c1 bm(0) (19)
with bp(0) = pH   (1  bm(0)) since be(0) = 0:We can compare bp(0) and bp(b) by using
(18) and (19). It follows that bp(b) > bp(0) if
bm(b)
(1  be(b)) + bc1 > bm(0):
It is useful to dene the LHS of the above disequality, after substituting (5), as a
generic function of m 2 [0; 1]
g(m) =
m
1  b
c2
( +mpL)
+
b
c1
:
The function g(m) takes values g(0) = b
c1
 and g(1) = 1
1  b
c2
pH
+ b
c1
 > b
c1
 and it
increases monotonically in m: Thus there must exists a value m such that g(m) =
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bm(0): This implies that bp(b) < bp(0) if bm(b) < m and bp(b) > bp(0) if bm(b)  m where
m  g 1 (bm(0)) : 2
Proof of Proposition 3: From the proof of Proposition 2, m is dened as m =
g 1 (bm(0)). Since g(m) is an increasing monotonic function, m behaves like this as
well. It follows that m increases with bm(0): From equation (19) it can be easily seen
that bm(0) decreases with D: 2
Proof of Proposition 4: In the case of a single project the entrepreneur issues
D1 = 1   !1 units of debt, while in the case of 2 projects D2 = 2   !2: To mantain
constant the leverage, i.e., the ratio between debt and total assets, it must be that
D1
D1 + !1
=
D2
D2 + !2
from which D2 = 2 D1 and !2 = 2!1. The proof requires to compare the threshold in
Proposition 2 with a new threshold in the case of 2 projects. We have to distinguish
between two cases, depending on whether br(b)D2 is above or below (R  b) :
Case (i): br(b)D2 < R  b: Then (14) becomes:
D2
@ bS(b)
@mi
=  br(b)D2(1  bp(b))(1  be(b));
while in this case (15) is: bS(b) = br(b)(1  bp(b))2:
Thus (6) and (7) simplify respectively to:
(1  be(b)) [(R  b)  br(b)D2(1  bp(b))]  c1 bm(b) = 0; (20)br(b)bp(b)(2  bp(b)) = 1: (21)
Substituting (21) in (20) gives:


R D2 (1  bp(b))bp(b)(2  bp(b))

= c1
bm(b)
(1  be(b)) + b; (22)
where bp(b) = pH   (1  bm(b))(1  be(b)): When b = 0 the above condition collapses
to


R D2 (1  bp(0))bp(0)(2  bp(0))

= c1 bm2(0) (23)
with bp(0) = pH   (1   bm2(0)) since be(0) = 0: We can compare bp(0) and bp(b) by
using (22) and (23). It follows that bp(b) > bp(0) if
bm(b)
(1  be(b)) + bc1 > bm2(0):
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The LHS of the above disequality can be dened as the same generic function g(m)
as that in Proposition 2. Given that the function g(m) is monotonically increasing
in m, there must exists a value m2 such that bp(b) > bp(o) if bm(b)  m2 where
m2  g 1 (bm2(0)) : We can compare m2 to the m in Proposition 2. Notice that the
function g(:) is the same in both cases and it is monotonically increasing. It is easy
to see that bm2(0) > bm(0) by comparing (19) to (23). Then it follows that m2 > m:
Case (ii): br(b)D2 > R  b: Then (14) becomes:
D2
@ bS(b)
@mi
=   [br(b)D2 bp(b) + (R  b) (1  2bp(b))] (1  be(b));
while in this case (15) isbS(b) = br(b)(1  bp(b))2 + 2
D2
[br(b)D2   (R  b)] bp(b)(1  bp(b)):
Thus (6) and (7) simplify respectively to:
(1  be(b)) [2 (R  b)  br(b)D2] bp(b)  c1 bm(b) = 0; (24)br(b)bp(b)2 + 2
D2
(R  b) bp(b)(1  bp(b)) = 1: (25)
Substituting (25) in (24) gives:


2R  D2bp(b)

= c1
bm(b)
(1  be(b)) + 2b; (26)
where bp = pH   (1  bm)(1  be): When b = 0 the above condition collapses to


2R  D2bp(0)

= c1 bm2(0); (27)
with bp(0) = pH   (1   bm2(0)): We can compare bp(b) and bp(0) by using (26) and
(27). It follows that bp(b) > bp(0) ifbm(b)
(1  be(b)) + 2 bc2 > bm2(0):
It is useful to dene the LHS of the above disequality, after substituting (5), as a
generic function of m 2 [0; 1]
h(m) =
m
1  b
c2
( +mpL)
+ 2
b
c1
 = g(m) +
b
c1
:
The function h(m) takes values h(0) = 2 b
c1
 and h(1) = 1
1  b
c2
pH
+ 2 b
c1
 > 2 b
c1

and it increases monotonically in m: Thus there must exists a value m2 such that
h(m2) = bm2(0): This implies that bp(b) > bp(0) if bm(b)  m2 wherem2  h 1 (bm2(0)) =
g 1
bm2(0)  bc1 : It is easy to see that bm2(0) = 2bm(0) by comparing (19) to
(27). For m2 > m it must be that

2bm(0)  b
c1


> bm(0): Given that bm(0) =

c1
[R  rD1] when (R   rD1) > b; i.e., when the bonus is suciently small not to
cause bankruptcy of the single project rm, it follows that m2 > m: 2
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Figure 1: Timing of the game.
T=0 T=1
j j j j
entrepreneur contract with entrepreneurs and projects
sets investors managers mature;
managerial is signed choose claims
compensation eorts are settled
22
F
ig
. 
2
: 
 T
h
e 
ga
m
e-
tr
ee
 r
ep
re
se
n
ts
th
e
st
ra
te
gi
c
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
m
i
an
d
ef
fo
rt
e i
d
ec
is
io
n
s
o
n
ea
ch
 p
ro
je
ct
i
b
y
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
an
d
 
m
an
ag
er
.
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
rs
an
d
m
an
ag
er
s 
ch
o
o
se
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
sl
y
an
d
 n
o
n
-c
o
o
p
er
at
iv
el
y.
W
h
en
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r 
m
o
n
it
o
rs
 w
it
h
 i
n
te
n
si
ty
m
: 
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
h
as
th
e
ch
o
ic
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 e
xe
rt
in
g 
ef
fo
rt
o
r
sh
ir
k
in
g
an
d
sa
v
in
g
th
e
co
st
o
f
ef
fo
rt
.
If
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
b
eh
av
es
 h
e 
ea
rn
s
th
e 
b
o
n
u
s
w
it
h
 
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 p
H
,
o
th
er
w
is
e,
w
h
en
 c
au
gh
t 
sh
ir
k
in
g,
h
e 
is
 f
ir
ed
. 
A
 n
ew
 m
an
ag
er
as
su
re
s
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
o
f 
su
cc
es
s
p
H
, 
an
d
ea
rn
s
th
e 
b
o
n
u
s
w
h
en
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
 s
u
cc
ee
d
s.
W
h
en
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r 
d
o
es
 n
o
t
m
o
n
it
o
r,
if
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
b
eh
av
es
 h
e 
ea
rn
s
th
e 
b
o
n
u
s
w
it
h
 p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 p
H
,
o
th
er
w
is
e 
w
it
h
th
e
lo
w
es
t 
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 p
L
.
E
N
T
R
E
P
R
E
N
E
U
R
M
A
N
A
G
E
R
 
m
i
1
-
m
i
e i
e i
1
-e
i
1
-e
i
p
H
(R
-b
)
p
H
b
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r’
s
re
tu
rn
:
M
an
ag
er
’s
u
ti
lit
y:
p
H
(R
-b
)
0
p
H
(R
-b
)
p
H
b
p
L
(R
-b
)
p
L
b
F
ig
.3
: 
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r’
s
eq
u
ili
b
ri
u
m
 m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
  
  
  
as
th
e 
b
o
n
u
s 
b
 c
h
an
ge
s 
fo
r
d
if
fe
re
n
t
le
v
el
s
o
f 
d
eb
t,
  
D
=
0
an
d
 1
.
T
h
e
fi
gu
re
is
 d
ra
w
n
 f
o
r
su
cc
es
s
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ti
es
o
f 
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
  
p
H
=
0
.8
5
an
d
p
L
=
0
.6
,
p
ro
je
ct
re
tu
rn
 R
=
 1
.6
5
,
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
co
st
c 1
=
0
.1
 a
n
d
 e
ff
o
rt
 c
o
st
 c
2
=
0
.3
5
.
b
m
)1
(
ˆ
=
D
m
mˆ0.
0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
5
0
.0
6
0
.0
7
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.81
mˆ
(D
=
0)
F
ig
.4
: 
F
ir
m
’s
eq
u
ili
b
ri
u
m
 p
ro
fi
ts
as
th
e 
b
o
n
u
s 
b
ch
an
ge
s 
fo
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
le
v
el
s
o
f
d
eb
t,
  
D
=
0
an
d
 1
.T
h
e
fi
gu
re
is
 d
ra
w
n
 f
o
r
su
cc
es
s
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ti
es
o
f 
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
  
p
H
=
0
.8
5
an
d
p
L
=
0
.6
,
p
ro
je
ct
re
tu
rn
 R
=
 1
.6
5
,
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
co
st
 c
1
=
0
.1
 a
n
d
 e
ff
o
rt
 c
o
st
 c
2
=
0
.3
5
.
π
b
)1
(
ˆ
=
D
pi
pi
pi(
D
=
0
)
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
5
0
.0
6
0
.0
7
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
